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The purpose of this study is to explore the link between corporate governance characteristics and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure of listed companies in the Pakistan stock Exchange (PSX), Pakistan. A sample of 179 
companies from financial and non-financial sectors are studied from 2009 to 2015. The data is collected from their 
annual reports and websites. Binary logistic regression analysis is employed to test the models. The results reveal 
that board size, number of meetings and board independence are significant corporate governance characteristics 
to establish the link with corporate social responsibility disclosure. This study also explore that the trend of CSR 
disclosure is increasing in financial as well as non-financial sector. Additionally, the companies disclose their CSR 
activities lead in financial performance as compare to their counterpart. This study adds in the literature to explore 
the influence of board characteristics on corporate social responsibility disclosure from a developing country’s 
perspective. 
 





he literature of last fifty years or so depicted a mounting interest in corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), whereby firms are being held liable for any events affecting society and environment. From 
this perception, firms are observed as part of a larger economic system in which their actions might 
affect components of the system and consequently the system itself (Hawken, 1993; Rasmussen, 1997). Nowadays, 
society of any country play a vital role by putting stress on firms not to observe irresponsible measures towards the 
society and environment (Beltratti, 2005). As a result, firms nowadays used CSR to gain a competitive advantage. 
Further, companies involve in CSR may also want to obtain the benefits of such practices since CSR activities might 
have cost them a considerable amount of resources, which they may need to rationalize to their shareholders. Firms 
may then decide to disclose their CSR activities to inform their stakeholders. 
 
Many corporations around the globe involve in CSR activities, some disclose their CSR activities in annual reports, 
and other publish it on their websites or issue separate CSR report. Cormier (2011) argued that the extra information 
of firm can bridge the gap between stakeholder and a firm and as a result affect the financial performance. Much of 
the prior empirical research based on CSR activities / disclosure and their impact on financial performance (Hart, 
1994; Johnson & Greening, 1994; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992; Shihping & Yang, 2014; Zhang, Zhang & Seiler, 2015). 
However, much of the research focused on developed countries (Newson & Deegan, 2002), whereas very few 
studies (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Talha, Christopher & Karthikeyani, 2016) concentrated on developing 
countries. Research on factors effecting CSR disclosure has mostly paid attention on the number of corporate 
characteristics such as company size (Simmons, 2016) and type of industry (Roberts, 1992). The link between 
corporate governance and CSR disclosure has been established through legitimacy and agency theory, but few 
studies test that link empirically (Hahn & Kuhnen, 2013; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The 
legitimacy theory reveals that firms seek legitimacy through CSR disclosure which has its own strategic importance 
for them.  
  
T 
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Based on the legitimacy and agency theory, the purpose of this study is to explore the role of corporate governance 
on corporate social responsibility disclosure as well as to compare the financial performance of the listed companies 
in Pakistan Stock exchange on the basis of CSR disclosure within financial and non-financial sector. Additionally, to 
explore the trend of CSR disclosure between financial and non-financial sector.  The descriptive analysis reveals that 
irrespective to sector, the overall trend to disclose CRS activities in listed companies of Pakistan is on increasing 
side from year to year. In comparison, on average, financial sector’s CSR disclosure is more than non-financial 
sector. The rest of the article is ordered as follows: the next section provides an overview of literature and 
hypothesis development. After data and methodology empirical results and discussion is presented. Finally, last 
section provides the conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research.    
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The agency theory is related to owner (principal)-manager (agent) relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), whereas 
agency problem and agency cost is considered as the conflict of interest between owner and manager of the business 
Board of directors appointed to avoid from agency problem and cost and to keep an eye on managers (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) which also strengthen the internal control system and in a result managers’ performance improved 
as well as the quality of CSR disclosure. states that society pressure on firms to conduct their activities in acceptable 
way is one of the cause to disclose CSR activities voluntarily.  
 
Legitimacy theory (LT) is considered as the most thriving to explain voluntary disclosure as compare to competing 
theories (Islam & Deegan, 2008). Newson and Deegan (2002) advocate that LT is the contract between firm and 
society like the principal – agent relationship to meet the societal expectations. LT expand the principal –agent 
relationship in favors of different stakeholders and this notion expand the functions of corporate governance. So, to 
maintain their claim on legitimacy managers are willing to disclose their CSR activities and other related 
information. Most of the research on CSR claimed that LT is the main driver for companies to disclose CSR in their 
audited annual reports (Cormier & Magnan, 2015; Woodward, Edwards & Birkin, 1996). LT emphasize the 
significance of societal acceptance in ensuring a company’s long term survival. In literature the studies related to 
factors influencing CSR disclosure found that firm size and industry type were statistically significant in explanation 
of CSR disclosure (Talha et al., 2016). Significance of firm size and industry type might be explained by LT. 
Though, LT was insufficient to explain the variation in findings due to country of origin. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) 
argued that legitimacy is deemed problematic as societal expectations varies with time and uncertain, furthermore 
it’s tough to recognize the principal to whom the agent is answerable (Woodward et al., 1996). Hence, this study is 
based on agency theory and legitimacy theory to explore the link between corporate governance characteristics and 
CSR disclosure.  
 
2.1 Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1.1 Board Size 
 
Existing literature on board size can be classified into two categories. One is in favor of large boards whereas other 
advocate smaller boards. The advocates of larger boards believed that large boards are inefficient as they are week in 
control of management and increase the agency cost. However, this notion is defying by stating that larger boards 
may less influenced by management. Small boards are deemed efficient but they may have influenced by managers. 
Moreover, it is observed that large boards are diverse with reference to the education, expertise and gender of 
directors (Laksmana, 2008). Various studies have reported a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board 
size (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Esa, Anum, & Gazali, 2012). Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between board size and CSR disclosure  
 
2.1.2 Board Meetings 
 
The number of meetings of board members in a year is used as one of the indicator of corporate governance 
(Laksmana, 2008), and also reflect the effectiveness of board and the level of control on delivered activities (Vafeas, 
1999; Laksmana, 2008). Laksmana (2008) states that regular numbers of meetings give them chance to share more 
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information and improved decision making, ultimately increased firm value. However, the diverse notion is that the 
board spent less time of directors which does not reflect in significant exchange of views among them (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999). In literature, less attention is given to frequency of board meetings to explore CSR 
disclosure. However, Giannaraki (2014) reported a positive association between number of meetings and CSR 
disclosure. Boards with large number of meetings likely to handle business operations and disclosure of CSR 
information to satisfy different stakeholders in an effective way. Therefore, in the present study, it is hypothesized: 
  
H2: There is a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and the extent of CSR disclosure. 
 
2.1.3 Executive Directors in the Board (Board Independence) 
 
Board independence is another significant feature of corporate governance. Advocates of the agency theory propose 
that independent directors in board may avoid from agency problems and in result board monitoring quality enrich 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Independent directors wield stress on managers to disclose more information and avoid 
agency costs. The literature has mixed results on the association of board independence and CSR disclosure. 
Number of studies reported negative association between CSR disclosure and board independence (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005) whereas, Barako & Brown (2008) reported a positive relationship between board independence and 
CSR disclosures. Based on the above arguments the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: There is a positive association between board independence and CSR disclosure. 
 
2.1.4 Gender Diversity in Board (021) 
 
Gender diversity as one of the aspect of board diversity gained a significant importance in corporate governance 
literature, and advocates of diversity argued that diverse boards may have better understanding of complex issues as 
compared to homogenous boards Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Moreover, it was found that female 
entrepreneurs play a pivotal role in the emerging economy of Pakistan (Ikram, Su, Fiaz, & Shabbir, 2016), thus it is 
imperative to take this dimension into consideration. Proportion of females in the board used as a proxy of gender 
diversity as well as board diversity (Carter et al., 2003). No satisfactory support exist related to CSR disclosure and 
gender diversity in the board. Daily and Dalton (2003) and Zhang, Zhu & Ding, (2013) suggest that the presence of 
females in the board of directors may compel the board to meet the stakeholders expectations, thus the execution of 
CSR and its disclosure is more viable. Thus, the number of females in the boards is significantly different with 
respect to the involvement of companies in CSR (Webb, 2004), whereas, Khan (2010) reported no association 
between CSR disclosure and female representation on the board of directors. Thus, based on the above studies, the 
hypothesis is stated as: 
 
H4: There is a positive association between number of women on board and CSR disclosure. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 
The stratified sample is selected at two stages, at first stage seven sectors are selected and on 2nd stage companies are 
selected randomly from selected sectors, total selected companies are 179 from 903 companies listed in Pakistan 
Stock Exchange (PSX). The annual data of selected companies collected from 2009 to 2015.  The overall year –firm 
observations are 1253. Table 1 represent the number of companies selected for the data collection. Data related to 
boards characteristics as well as financial information collected and compiled from the audited published annual 
reports of the selected companies. The companies disclose their CSR information differently, some of them use their 
web site for CSR disclosure, while some disclose in their annual reports and some prefer to publish CSR reports 
separately. So, all the above stated sources were used to get information about selected companies CSR disclosure.  
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 










3.2 Measurement of variables  
 
The dependent variable, CSR disclosure was formed as binary variable. A firm that disclose their CSR activities was 
allotted “1” whereas “0” is allotted to firm which does not disclose their CSR. The explanatory variables of the 
study were board size, board meeting during a year, board independence and gender diversity in the board. Financial 




Table 2. Description of variables 
Dependent Variable Operationalization 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) Firm disclose their CSR activities=1 
 Firm does not disclose CSR activities=0 
Explanatory Variables 
Board Size (BS) Total number of directors in the board 
Board Meetings (BM) Number of meetings of board members in a year 
Board Independence (BI)  Proportion of independent directors 
Gender Diversity (GD) Proportion of female directors in the board 
Control Variables 
Total assets (LTA) Natural log of total assets 
Shares (LSH) Natural log of total number of shares 
ROE Return on equity 
DPS Dividend per share 
Tobin q Ratio of market value to total assets 
 
 
3.3 Method of Analysis 
 
To test the stated hypothesis, binary logistic regression analysis was employed which developed by David 
Cox (1958), which helps us to estimate the odds of a binary outcome variable on the basis of one or more 
explanatory variables which can be categorical or quantitative like other forms of regression models. Considering 
the difference between classical linear regression model (CLRM) and logistic regression model, the assumptions of 
CLRM are no longer valid for binary logistic regression model in particular, errors cannot follow normal 
distribution. To execute binary logistic regression, first control variables were tested and then along with 
explanatory variables full logistic regression model executed. Peng, So, Stage, and St John, (2002) suggest that 
minimum number of observations for logistic regression analysis should be 100, so 1253 observations are quite 
adequate for this study. 
 
Accordingly, two logistic regression models are as under: 
 
Model 1: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑃 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷 = ln{𝑃(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷)/[1 − 𝑃 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷 ]}= 𝛼 + 𝛽:𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽=𝐿𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽?𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽B𝐷𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽C𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 
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Model 2: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑃 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷 = ln 𝑃 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷1 − 𝑃 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽:𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽=𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽?𝐵𝐼 + 𝛽B𝐺𝐷 + 𝛽C𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽J𝐿𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽K𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽L𝐷𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽M𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Graph 1, depicts that there is an increasing trend between financial and non-financial sectors from 2009 to 2015 to 
disclose their corporate social responsibility activities. On average 30% of the selected companies of non-financial 
sector disclose their CSR activities over the selected time period whereas in financial sector the proportion is 49%. 
To compare the financial performance of companies within financial and non-financial sector with reference to CSR 
disclosure, year wise independent sample t-test is applied. Table 3 describe that, in non-financial sector in every year 
the total number of shares differ significantly between the companies involve in CSR disclosure or not, implies that 
the companies involve in CSR disclosure perform better than those not involve in CSR disclosure In financial sector 
the difference of number of shares significant from 2011 to 2015, indicates the companies involve in CSR disclosure 
perform better.  
 
 
Table 3. T-test to compare the performance with respect to CSR Disclosure 
 Financial Sector Non-Financial Sector 
Year t-stat Sig t-stat sig 
2009 -1.32 0.20 -1.86 0.07 
2010 -1.29 0.21 -3.69 0.00 
2011 -1.82 0.08 -3.44 0.00 
2012 -2.11 0.05 -4.41 0.00 
2013 -0.69 0.50 -3.29 0.00 
2014 -2.26 0.03 -2.98 0.00 
2015 -2.49 0.02 -2.44 0.02 
 
 
Table 4 and 5 describe the descriptive statistics in form of minimum, maximum, average and variation of the data 
and spearman correlation coefficients of the variables involved in this study respectfully. The dependent variable 
corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) has a mean of 0.39 suggested that 39% of the sample companies 
over the selected time period disclose their CSR activities. The board size ranges from 4 to 15 whereas the average 
board size is 7.89 which is consistent with the board size reported in various studies of Asia and Africa (Esa et al. 
2012; Barako et al., 2008). The average number of meeting of the board members held in a year is 1.05 and 
maximum number of meeting held in a year does not exceed from two. Number of independent directors in the 
board is used as the indicator of board independence which varies from 0 to 7 whereas the average number of 
independent directors is 1.84 indicates in average 2 members of the board are observed independent which is in line 
for firms in Asian economies. Proportion of female directors in the board is used as in indicator of gender diversity 
which ranges from 13% to 43% and the average 0.26 indicate that 26% of the directors in the boards of listed 
companies of Pakistan Stock exchange are females. Similarly, the descriptive statistics of the financial indicators are 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSRD) 0 1 .39 .49 
Board Size (BS) 4 15 7.89 1.41 
Board Meetings(BM) 1 2 1.05 .23 
Board Independence (BI) 0 7 1.84 1.41 
Proportion of female directors (GD) .13 .43 .26 .11 
Log of Total Assets (LTA) 9.19 20.02 15.37 1.69 
Log of Total number of Shares (LSHARES) 6.21 17.13 10.89 2.01 
Return on Equity (ROE) -319 94 -.12 9.99 
Dividend Per Share (DPS) 0 171 3.86 10.48 
Tobin's q 0 526 5.01 32.32 
 
 
Table 5 present the spearman correlation coefficient between the variables involved in this study. The outcome 
variable, corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is positively associated with board size and board 
meetings and the association between proportion of female directors and corporate social disclosure is insignificant. 
Among the financial indicators, the indicators of size, total assets and number of shares, are positively associated 
with corporate social responsibility disclosure, indicator of market value, Tobin’s Q is also positively associated 
with corporate social responsibility disclosure at 1% level of significance. 
 
Furthermore, corporate board’s characteristics are negatively correlated as board size is negatively and statistically 
associated with board independence and proportion of female directors at 1% level of significance. Board meetings 
and board independence is observed to be positively associated and statistically significant. Similarly, the bivariate 
associations between financial variables, which are used as control variables, are found to be positively and 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance. Moreover, the strength of association between different variables 
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Table 5. Correlation Co-efficient 
 Board Size Board Meetings Board Independence 
Prop. of Female 
Directors LTA 
Board Size 1.00     Board Meetings -0.02 1.00    Board Independence -.100** .109** 1.00   Proportion of female directors .492** 0.09 -0.08 1.00  LTA .218** .150** -.155** 0.01 1.00 
LSHARES .277** .179** -.196** 0.11 .735** 
Return on Equity 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 .144** 
Dividend Per Share .093* .159** -0.01 0.03 .474** 
Tobin's q .111** .084* -.122** -0.10 .255** 
Corporate Social Responsibility .260** .155** 0.03** .417 .200** 
 
 
 L SHARES Return on Equity 
Dividend Per 
Share Tobin's q CSR 
LSHARES 1.00     Return on Equity 0.02 1.00    Dividend Per Share .155** .403** 1.00   Tobin's q .298** .092** .465** 1.00  Corporate Social Responsibility .276** 0.05 0.06 .147** 1.00 
Note: **, * Significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively 
 
 
4.2 Logistic Regression Results 
 
Prior to logistic regression analysis, for robustness of the analysis, the tests of linearity, multicollinearity and outliers 
were performed. To test the linearity between logit and continuous explanatory variables, Box-Tidwell 
transformation is applied, results showed that total assets and number of shares were significant (p<0.01). Natural 
logarithm transformation applied on total assets and number of shares to validate the linearity. In Table 4, all the 
correlation coefficient among variables in the study are less than the critical level of 0.8 which suggest that there is 
no problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1988; Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black 1995). To observe the outlier affect, 
Studentized residuals, deviance and Cook’s distance (D) were performed and it was observed that model was not 
influenced by extreme values. 
 
Table 6 presents the statistics of the goodness of model and the explanatory power of the model. Model I based on 
financial variables, which are used as control variables of the study. In model I, chi-square statistics suggest that 
sample data describe the purposed model. The pseudo co-efficient of determination are measured by Cox-Snell and 
Nagelkerke, which are in acceptable limits. The predictive accuracy of Model I was 71.5% which describe the 
significance of the financial indicators of the firm to explain the firm’s Corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
Model II based on corporate governance characteristics and control variables and the value of chi-square and 
significance values suggest that sample data describe Model II. Additionally, the Cox & Snell R Square is 34% and 
Nagelkerke R Square is 52%. The overall predictive accuracy of Model II is 84.4. 
 
 
Table 6. Logistic Regression fit statistics 
  Model I Model II 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients   
Chi-square / Sig 88.443 / 0.000 18.472 / 0.018 
-2 Log likelihood 847.770 29.201 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.12 0.34 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.16 0.52 
Predictive accuracy 71.5 84.4 
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Table 7 represents the results of logistic regression results in form of co-efficient (B), standard error (S.E), wald 
statistic (Wald), significance (Sig.) and odds ratio (Exp(B)). In model I, the impact of log of total number of shares 
and Tobin’q are positive and significantly associated with CSR disclosure as significance value less than 1%, 
whereas DPS is significant at 10% level. The likelihood of CSR disclosure increases 1.414 times as the log of 
number of shares increase by one point, similarly the probability of CSR disclosure increases 1.006 times as the 
Tobin Q increases one point.   
 
 
Table 7. Logistic regression model results 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Model I      
LTA -.098 .060 2.669 .102 .907 
LSHARES*** .346 .051 45.615 .000 1.414 
ROE .017 .015 1.237 .266 1.017 
DPS* .011 .007 2.923 .087 1.011 
Tobinq*** .006 .002 8.157 .004 1.006 
Constant -2.833 .624 20.616 .000 .059 
Model II      
LTA -.139 .096 2.120 .145 .870 
LSHARES*** .314 .077 16.615 .000 1.368 
ROE .017 .015 1.191 .275 1.017 
DPS .010 .011 .780 .377 1.010 
Tobinq** .006 .003 5.575 .018 1.006 
BS*** .373 .091 16.984 .000 1.452 
BM*** 1.186 .323 13.508 .000 3.274 
BED** .111 .053 4.375 .036 1.118 
GD .100 1.136 .008 .930 1.105 
Constant -6.248 .900 48.199 .000 .002 
 
 
From the results of model II, among corporate governance characteristics the Wald statistic of Board size, Board 
meetings and Board independence are positive as well as significant at 1% and 5% level, which support the earlier 
stated hypothesis 1, 2 and 3.whereas, the proportion of female directors in the board was found to be insignificant 
and the findings does not support hypothesis 4.The positive coefficient of board size describe that larger boards may 
influence the CSR disclosure policy and the odds of CSR disclosure increased 1.452 times as board size increases by 
one member. The likelihood of CSR disclosure increases 3.274 times as number of meetings of the board members 
increase by one point, similarly, the probability of CSR disclosure increases as the proportion of independent 
directors increases one point.   
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
From agency and legitimacy theories background, this research explores the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on corporate social responsibility disclosure. To test the hypothesis of this study, a sample of 179 
companies listed in Pakistan stock exchanges (PSE) from seven different sectors are observed from 2009 to 
2015.The findings of the study based on binary logistic regression analysis showed that board size, board meetings 
and board independence has a positive link towards corporate social responsibility disclosure, whereas proportion of 
female directors in the board has insignificant impact on corporate social disclosure (CSRD). In Pakistan female’s 
participation in boards not like the developing countries, which also reflect the dominance of male members in 
boards of selected companies, mostly female directors act as latent members of the board. 
 
Empirical findings support the literature related to accepted hypothesis, though theoretical link between corporate 
governance characteristics and corporate social responsibility disclosure is still week, especially in developing 
country context. The findings also favor the literature that firm size has a significant impact on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, as number of shares increases the likelihood of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
increases to avoid agency problems. Additionally, the indicator of market reputation, Tobin’q is positively and 
significantly linked with corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
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This study has few implications to the CSR literature. This study adds in the literature from CSR disclosure 
perspective and especially in developing country’s context. Additionally, it should be acknowledged that listed 
companies in Pakistan voluntary commence corporate social disclosure in lack of bindings of CSR disclosure from 
regulatory agencies as the notion of CSR disclosure is somewhat new for corporate managers. From practical 
implications perspective, findings reveal that large boards, number of meetings and board independence are likely to 
predict CSR disclosure, however from resource dependence perspective only large firms can afford the luxury of 
large boards. Large boards have their own consequences as the association of board size with number of meetings 
and board independence are negative.  
 
Findings of this research are not free from few limitations. The dependent variable is a binary variable which does 
not indicate the quality and extent of CSR disclosure. Consequently, non-disclosure of CSR does not reflect the 
company’s non-involvement in CSR activities. The sample is taken from only one country and the results can be 
further validate to include the data of other countries. Considering the limitations of this research, Future research 
need to study the impact of board characteristics on the quality and extent of CSR disclosure, furthermore the impact 
of ownership structure on quality and extent of CSR disclosure may enrich the CSR literature. The topic can be 
further explored from CEO profiles perspective and mixed research methodology may help to get more insights of 
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